

Iris: Higher-Order Concurrent Separation Logic

Lecture 21: Clutch: Reasoning about randomized programs in Iris

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Overview

Earlier:

- ▶ Operational Semantics of $\lambda_{\text{ref,conc}}$: $e, (h, e) \rightsquigarrow (h, e')$, and $(h, \mathcal{E}) \rightarrow (h', \mathcal{E}')$
- ▶ Basic Logic of Resources : $l \hookrightarrow v, P * Q, P \multimap Q, \Gamma \mid P \vdash Q$
- ▶ Basic Separation Logic : $\{P\} e \{v.Q\} : \text{Prop}, \text{isList } l \text{ xs}, \text{ADTs}, \text{foldr}$
- ▶ Later (\triangleright) and Persistent (\square) Modalities.
- ▶ Concurrency Intro, Invariants and Ghost State
- ▶ CAS, Spin Locks, Concurrent Counter Modules.
- ▶ Monotone Resource Algebra
- ▶ Case studies: Ticket Lock, Array Based Queuing Lock, and Stack with Helping
- ▶ More details of constructions, e.g., weakest preconditions, etc.
- ▶ Logical Relations for safety & type abstraction in Iris

Today:

- ▶ Randomized programming
- ▶ Operational Semantics of $\mathbf{F}_{\mu, \text{ref}}^{\text{rand}}$
- ▶ Contextual & logical refinement

Plan

- ▶ Part I
 - ▶ Why randomization?
 - ▶ A probabilistic language: syntax & operational semantics
 - ▶ Properties beyond functional correctness
 - ▶ Contextual refinement
 - ▶ A probabilistic refinement logic

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 - ▶ Properties beyond functional correctness
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 - ▶ A probabilistic refinement logic
- ▶ Part II
 - ▶ Case study: ElGamal encryption
 - ▶ Asynchronous coupling rules
 - ▶ Vistas

Randomization in CS: Some examples

- ▶ Random (number) generation
 - ▶ Simulations (physics, modelling), all of the below

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- ▶ Efficient-on-average exact algorithms (Las Vegas)
 - ▶ quicksort, skip lists, treaps

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 - ▶ primality testing (Miller-Rabin), approximate counters, Bloom filters
- ▶ Efficient-on-average exact algorithms (Las Vegas)
 - ▶ quicksort, skip lists, treaps
- ▶ Impossible without randomisation
 - ▶ Distributed systems
 - ▶ symmetry breaking: dining philosophers, consensus
 - ▶ Cryptography
 - ▶ Public key encryption, (differential) privacy, security games

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Prove functional correctness and probabilistic properties of randomized programs!

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Examples of what has been formalised in Clutch:

1. functional correctness of quicksort,
2. security of the one-time pad,
3. security of the ElGamal public key scheme,
4. correctness of lazy hash functions via refinement,
5. correctness of large random integer generation via refinement.

We will see 1-3 in class; 4 and 5 can be found in the Clutch paper.

Functional correctness

Recall randomised quicksort:

```
rec qs l :=  
  let n := length l in  
  if n < 1 then l else  
    let ip := rand (n - 1) in  
    let (p, r) := list_remove_nth l ip in  
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We want to show:

$$\forall xs. \forall l. \{isList\ l\ xs\} \text{ qs } l \{v. \exists xs', isList\ v\ xs' \wedge isPermutation\ xs'\ xs \wedge isSorted\ xs'\}$$

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What about `rand`? How do we expect the proof to go?

Probabilistic refinement

Prove that encryption with a one-time pad (OTP) hides information perfectly.

► OTP encryption:

```
let keygen := flip
```

```
let enc := xor
```

```
let xor  $b_1$   $b_2$  := if  $b_1$  then not  $b_2$  else  $b_2$ 
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► Security definition:

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let otp :=  $\lambda$  msg. let key := flip in xor key msg
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```
let spec :=  $\lambda$  msg. flip
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- ▶ Security definition:

```
let otp :=  $\lambda$  msg. let key := flip in xor key msg
let spec :=  $\lambda$  msg. flip
```

We want to show that for all $b : \text{bool}$, “otp b looks like spec b ”.

This is not expressible as a Hoare triple!

NB: readily generalises to bitstrings of any size.

The language $F_{\mu, \text{ref}}^{\text{rand}}$

- ▶ Syntax: modify $\lambda_{\text{ref}, \text{conc}}$ as follows

$$\begin{array}{lcl} & & \vdots \\ \text{Exp} & e & ::= \dots \mid \text{rand } e \mid \text{fork } \{e\} \\ \text{ECtx} & E & ::= \dots \mid \text{rand } E \\ \text{Heap} & h & \in \text{Loc} \xrightarrow{\text{fin}} \text{Val} \\ \text{TPool} & \mathcal{E} & \in \mathbb{N} \xrightarrow{\text{fin}} \text{Exp} \\ \text{Config} & \rho & ::= (h, e) \end{array}$$

- ▶ Syntactic sugar: write `flip` for the term $(0 = \text{rand } 1)$

Operational semantics, I

- ▶ $\lambda_{\text{ref,conc}}$: stepping *relation* $(h, e) \rightsquigarrow (h', e') \subseteq \text{Config} \times \text{Config}$
- ▶ $\mathbf{F}_{\mu, \text{ref}}^{\text{rand}}$: stepping *function* $\text{step} : \text{Config} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(\text{Config})$

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Definition (Sub-distribution)

A (discrete) *sub-distribution* over a countable set A is a function $\mu : A \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that $\sum_{a \in A} \mu(a) \leq 1$. We write $\mathcal{D}(A)$ for the set of all sub-distributions over A .

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Write $(h, e) \rightarrow^p (h', e')$ if $\text{step}(h, e)(h', e') = p$.

- ▶ for deterministic reductions $(h, e) \rightsquigarrow (h', e')$:
 $(h, e) \rightarrow^1 (h', e')$, i.e. $\text{step}(h, e)(h', e') = 1$, and 0 elsewhere,
- ▶ $\text{step}(h, \text{rand } N)(h, k) = \frac{1}{N+1}$ for $0 \leq k \leq N$.

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E.g. $\text{step}(h, \text{rand } 0) = \{(h, 0) \mapsto 1\}$,
and $\text{step}(h, \text{rand } 1) = \{(h, 0) \mapsto 1/2, (h, 1) \mapsto 1/2\}$.

Pure reduction: same as for $\lambda_{\text{ref,conc}}$

$$v \odot v' \stackrel{\text{pure}}{\rightsquigarrow} v''$$

$$\text{if } v'' = v \odot v'$$

$$\text{if true then } e_1 \text{ else } e_2 \stackrel{\text{pure}}{\rightsquigarrow} e_1$$

$$\text{if false then } e_1 \text{ else } e_2 \stackrel{\text{pure}}{\rightsquigarrow} e_2$$

$$\pi_i(v_1, v_2) \stackrel{\text{pure}}{\rightsquigarrow} v_i$$

$$\left(\begin{array}{l} \text{match inj}_i v \text{ with} \\ \quad \text{inj}_1 x_1 \Rightarrow e_1 \\ \quad | \text{inj}_2 x_2 \Rightarrow e_2 \\ \text{end} \end{array} \right) \stackrel{\text{pure}}{\rightsquigarrow} e_i[v/x_i]$$

$$(\text{rec } f \ x := e) v \stackrel{\text{pure}}{\rightsquigarrow} e[(\text{rec } f \ x := e)/f, v/x]$$

Configuration reduction

$(h, e) \rightarrow^1 (h, e')$	if $e \overset{\text{pure}}{\rightsquigarrow} e'$
$(h, \text{ref}(v)) \rightarrow^1 (h[\ell \mapsto v], \ell)$	where $\ell = \text{freshLoc}(\text{dom}(h))$
$(h, !\ell) \rightarrow^1 (h, h(\ell))$	if $\ell \in \text{dom}(h)$
$(h, \ell \leftarrow v) \rightarrow^1 (h[\ell \mapsto v], ())$	if $\ell \in \text{dom}(h)$
$(h, \text{rand } N) \rightarrow^p (h, k)$	$p = \frac{1}{N+1}$ and $0 \leq k \leq N$
$(h, E[e]) \rightarrow^p (h', E[e'])$	if $(h, e) \rightarrow^p (h', e')$

Aside: Probabilities and concurrency

- ▶ the \rightsquigarrow relation of $\lambda_{\text{ref,conc}}$ can relate a reducible expression to more than one reduct: $([l \mapsto 7][0 \mapsto (l \leftarrow 42), 1 \mapsto !l]) \rightsquigarrow$
$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} ([l \mapsto 42][0 \mapsto (), 1 \mapsto !l]) \rightsquigarrow ([l \mapsto 42][0 \mapsto (), 1 \mapsto 42]) \\ ([l \mapsto 7][0 \mapsto (l \leftarrow 42), 1 \mapsto 7]) \rightsquigarrow ([l \mapsto 42][0 \mapsto (), 1 \mapsto 7]) \end{array} \right.$$
- ▶ could we have used a relation on $\text{Config} \times \mathcal{D}(\text{Config})$?
- ▶ maybe: we can find a monadic structure to define program evaluation
- ▶ but: no canonical solution (equational theory “not as expected”) — the “right answer” depends on the application.

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- ▶ but: no canonical solution (equational theory “not as expected”) — the “right answer” depends on the application.

Is banishing `fork {e}` enough?

Operational semantics, II

How do we iterate the step : $Config \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(Config)$ function to *evaluate* programs?

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Lemma (Probability Monad)

Let $\mu \in \mathcal{D}(A)$, $a \in A$, and $f : A \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(B)$. Then

1. $\text{bind}(f, \mu)(b) \triangleq \sum_{a \in A} \mu(a) \cdot f(a)(b)$
2. $\text{ret}(a)(a') \triangleq 1$ if $a = a'$, 0 otherwise

gives monadic structure to \mathcal{D} . We write $\mu \gg f$ for $\text{bind}(f, \mu)$.

We can chain steps together with bind .

Operational semantics, III

Definition (*n*-step execution)

$$\text{exec}_n(e, \sigma) \triangleq \begin{cases} \mathbf{0} & \text{if } e \notin \text{Val} \text{ and } n = 0 \\ \text{ret}(e) & \text{if } e \in \text{Val} \\ \text{step}(e, \sigma) \gg \text{exec}_{(n-1)} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Operational semantics, III

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We can take the limit since *exec* is monotone and bounded.

$$\text{exec}(\rho)(v) \triangleq \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \text{exec}_n(\rho)(v)$$

A program thus induces a distribution on values.

Example: flip, I

Let $\rho = ([], flip) \triangleq ([], 0 = \text{rand } 1)$. Execution of ρ yields the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{exec}(\rho) &= \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \text{exec}_n(\rho) = \text{exec}_2(\rho) \\ &= \text{step}(\rho) \gg (\lambda \rho'. \text{step } \rho' \gg (\lambda (h'', e''). \text{ret } e'' \text{ if } e'' \in \text{Val} \text{ else } \mathbf{0})) \quad (*) \end{aligned}$$

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We compute: $\text{step}([], 0 = \text{rand } 1) = \{([], 0 = 0) \mapsto 0.5, ([], 0 = 1) \mapsto 0.5, - \mapsto 0\}$,

$\text{step}([], 0 = 0) = \{([], \text{true}) \mapsto 1, - \mapsto 0\}$, $\text{step}([], 0 = 1) = \{([], \text{false}) \mapsto 1, - \mapsto 0\}$

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$$(*) = \text{step}(\rho) \gg \lambda \rho'. \lambda v. \sum_{(h'', e'') \in \text{Config}} \text{step}(\rho')((h'', e'')) \cdot ((\text{ret } e'' \text{ if } e'' \in \text{Val} \text{ else } \mathbf{0}) v)$$

$$= \text{step}(\rho) \gg \lambda \rho'. \lambda v. \sum_{(h'', e'') \in \text{Config}} \text{step}(\rho')((h'', e'')) \cdot (1 \text{ if } e'' = v \text{ else } 0)$$

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What would have happened if we'd only run `exec` for one step?

Example: flip, II


`step([], 0 = rand 1) =`

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
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
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
Example: flip, III

How does `flip` relate to `not flip`?



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Example: adding two random numbers

$$(\square, \text{rand } N + \text{rand } K)$$

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$$([\], \text{rand } N + \text{rand } K) \rightarrow \frac{1}{N+1} ([\], i + \text{rand } K)$$

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
$$([\], \text{rand } N + \text{rand } K) \rightarrow \frac{1}{N+1} ([\], i + \text{rand } K) \rightarrow \frac{1}{K+1} ([\], i + j)$$

For $N = 2, K = 3$:

Example: adding two random numbers

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


bind
→


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$$(\rho, \text{rand } N + \text{rand } K) \rightarrow \frac{1}{N+1} (\rho, i + \text{rand } K) \rightarrow \frac{1}{K+1} (\rho, i + j)$$

For $N = 2, K = 3$:



bind
→



Example: recursion


Let ℓ be a location and write σ_i for the heap $[\ell \mapsto i]$.

Define $e \triangleq (\text{rec } f _ := \text{if flip then } !\ell \text{ else } (\ell \leftarrow !\ell + 1; f())) ()$.

Example: recursion

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
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Define $e \triangleq (\text{rec } f _ := \text{if flip then } !\ell \text{ else } (\ell \leftarrow !\ell + 1; f())) ()$.



The result is an infinite tree (distribution on values).

Reasoning about $F_{\mu, \text{ref}}^{\text{rand}}$ programs: correctness

```
rec qs l :=  
  let n := length l in  
  if n < 1 then l else  
    let ip := rand (n - 1) in  
    let (p, r) := list_remove_nth l ip in  
    let (le, gt) := partition r p in  
    let (les, gts) := (qs le, qs gt) in  
    les ++ (p :: gts)
```

For quicksort, the following is enough:

$$\frac{S \vdash \forall k, 0 \leq k \leq N \Rightarrow \{P\} k \{Q\}}{S \vdash \{P\} \text{ rand } N \{Q\}}$$

Note: Q is a predicate on *values*, not distributions on values!

$$\forall xs. \forall l. \{isList\ l\ xs\} \text{ qs } l \{v. \exists xs', isList\ v\ xs' \wedge isPermutation\ xs'\ xs \wedge isSorted\ xs'\}$$

Reasoning about $F_{\mu, \text{ref}}^{\text{rand}}$ programs: contextual refinement

```
let keygen    := flip
let enc       := xor
let xor  $b_1 b_2$  := if  $b_1$  then not  $b_2$  else  $b_2$ 

let otp      :=  $\lambda \text{msg}. \text{let key} := \text{flip in xor key msg}$ 
let spec     :=  $\lambda \text{msg}. \text{flip}$ 
```

We want to show that `otp` exhibits the same *observable behaviour* as `spec`.

Reasoning about $F_{\mu, \text{ref}}^{\text{rand}}$ programs: contextual refinement

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Let \mathcal{C} be a well-typed program context, i.e. a program of type τ' with a hole of type τ .
Let's fix $\tau' = \text{bool}$.

$$\Theta \mid \Gamma \vdash e_1 \lesssim_{\text{ctx}} e_2 : \tau \quad \triangleq \quad \forall (\mathcal{C} : (\Theta \mid \Gamma \vdash \tau) \Rightarrow (\emptyset \mid \emptyset \vdash \text{bool})), \sigma : \text{State}, b : \text{bool} . \\ \text{exec}(\mathcal{C}[e_1], \sigma) b \leq \text{exec}(\mathcal{C}[e_2], \sigma) b$$

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How can we possibly reason about *all contexts* \mathcal{C} ?

Reasoning about $\mathbf{F}_{\mu, \text{ref}}^{\text{rand}}$ programs: logical refinement

We define a binary logical relation in terms of a notion of weakest precondition for $\mathbf{F}_{\mu, \text{ref}}^{\text{rand}}$, which supports relational reasoning:

$$\Delta \vDash_{\mathcal{E}} e_1 \lesssim e_2 : \tau$$

“In environment Δ , the expression e_1 refines the expression e_2 at type τ under the invariants in \mathcal{E} .”

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Theorem (Soundness)

Let Ξ be a type variable context, and assume that, for all Δ assigning a relational interpretation to all type variables in Ξ , we can derive $\Delta \mid \Gamma \vDash e_1 \lesssim e_2 : \tau$. Then $\Xi \mid \Gamma \vdash e_1 \lesssim_{\text{ctx}} e_2 : \tau$

Logical refinement: Structural & deterministic rules

REL-PURE-L

$$\frac{e_1 \overset{\text{pure}}{\rightsquigarrow} e'_1 \quad \Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} E[e'_1] \lesssim e_2 : \tau}{\Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} E[e_1] \lesssim e_2 : \tau}$$

REL-PURE-R

$$\frac{e_2 \overset{\text{pure}}{\rightsquigarrow} e'_2 \quad \Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e_1 \lesssim E[e'_2] : \tau}{\Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e_1 \lesssim E[e_2] : \tau}$$

REL-ALLOC-L

$$\frac{\forall l. l \mapsto v * \Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} E[l] \lesssim e_2 : \tau}{\Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} E[\text{ref}(v)] \lesssim e_2 : \tau}$$

REL-ALLOC-R

$$\frac{\forall l. l \mapsto_s v * \Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e_1 \lesssim E[l] : \tau}{\Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e_1 \lesssim E[\text{ref}(v)] : \tau}$$

REL-LOAD-L

$$\frac{l \mapsto v \quad l \mapsto v * \Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} E[v] \lesssim e_2 : \tau}{\Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} E[!l] \lesssim e_2 : \tau}$$

REL-LOAD-R

$$\frac{l \mapsto_s v \quad l \mapsto_s v * \Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e_1 \lesssim E[v] : \tau}{\Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e_1 \lesssim E[!l] : \tau}$$

REL-STORE-L

$$\frac{l \mapsto v \quad l \mapsto w * \Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} E[()] \lesssim e_2 : \tau}{\Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} E[l \leftarrow w] \lesssim e_2 : \tau}$$

REL-STORE-R

$$\frac{l \mapsto_s v \quad l \mapsto_s w * \Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e_1 \lesssim E[()] : \tau}{\Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e_1 \lesssim E[l \leftarrow w] : \tau}$$

REL-REC

$$\frac{\Box (\forall v_1, v_2. \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) * \Delta \Vdash_{\top} (\text{rec } f_1 \ x_1 := e_1) \ v_1 \lesssim (\text{rec } f_2 \ x_2 := e_2) \ v_2 : \sigma)}{\Delta \Vdash_{\top} \text{rec } f_1 \ x_1 := e_1 \lesssim \text{rec } f_2 \ x_2 := e_2 : \tau \rightarrow \sigma}$$

REL-RETURN

$$\frac{\llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2)}{\Delta \Vdash_{\top} v_1 \lesssim v_2 : \tau}$$

REL-BIND

$$\frac{\Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} e_1 \lesssim e_2 : \tau \quad \forall v_1, v_2. \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) * \Delta \Vdash_{\top} E[v_1] \lesssim E'[v_2] : \sigma}{\Delta \Vdash_{\mathcal{E}} E[e_1] \lesssim E'[e_2] : \sigma}$$

Logical refinement: Probabilistic rules

$$\frac{\text{REL-RAND-L} \quad \forall n \leq N. \Delta \vDash_{\mathcal{E}} E[n] \lesssim e_2 : \tau}{\Delta \vDash_{\mathcal{E}} E[\text{rand}(N)] \lesssim e_2 : \tau}$$

$$\frac{\text{REL-RAND-R} \quad e_1 \notin \text{Val} \quad \forall n \leq N. \Delta \vDash_{\mathcal{E}} e_1 \lesssim E[b] : \tau}{\Delta \vDash_{\mathcal{E}} e_1 \lesssim E[\text{rand}(N)] : \tau}$$

$$\frac{\text{REL-COUPLE-RANDS} \quad f \text{ bijection} \quad \forall n \leq N. \Delta \vDash_{\mathcal{E}} E[n] \lesssim E'[f(n)] : \tau}{\Delta \vDash_{\mathcal{E}} E[\text{rand}(N)] \lesssim E'[\text{rand}(N)] : \tau}$$

One-time pad is secure

let keygen := flip

let otp := λ msg. let key := flip in xor key msg

let enc := xor

let spec := λ msg. flip

let xor b_1 b_2 := if b_1 then not b_2 else b_2

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{}{\llbracket \text{bool} \rrbracket (\text{false}, \text{false})} \\
 \frac{}{\vDash \text{false} \approx \text{false} : \text{bool}} \\
 \frac{}{\vDash (\text{xor true true}) \approx (0 = 1) : \text{bool}} \quad \vdots \\
 \frac{}{\vDash (\text{xor true } b) \approx (0 = f(0)) : \text{bool}} \quad \frac{}{\vDash \text{xor false } b \approx 0 = f(1) : \text{bool}} \\
 \frac{f \text{ bij.} \quad \forall 0 \leq n \leq 1. \vDash (\text{let key} := (0 = n) \text{ in xor key } b) \approx (0 = f(n)) : \text{bool}}{\vDash (\text{let key} := (0 = \text{rand } 1) \text{ in xor key } b) \approx (0 = \text{rand } 1) : \text{bool}} \\
 \frac{}{\vDash \text{otp } b \approx \text{spec } b : \text{bool}} \\
 \frac{\square (\forall v_1, v_2. \llbracket \text{bool} \rrbracket (v_1, v_2) \rightarrow * \vDash_{\top} \text{otp } v_1 \approx \text{spec } v_2 : \text{bool})}{\vDash_{\top} \text{otp} \approx \text{spec} : \text{bool} \rightarrow \text{bool}}
 \end{array}$$

$$f(n) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } (n = 0) \oplus b \\ 1 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

Relational interpretation of types

$$\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) \triangleq \Delta(\alpha)(v_1, v_2)$$

$$\llbracket \text{unit} \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) \triangleq v_1 = v_2 = ()$$

$$\llbracket \text{int} \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) \triangleq \exists z \in \mathbb{Z}. v_1 = v_2 = z$$

$$\llbracket \text{nat} \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) \triangleq \exists n \in \mathbb{N}. v_1 = v_2 = n$$

$$\llbracket \text{bool} \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) \triangleq \exists b \in \mathbb{B}. v_1 = v_2 = b$$

$$\llbracket \tau \rightarrow \sigma \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) \triangleq \square (\forall w_1, w_2. \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}(w_1, w_2) * \Delta \vDash v_1 w_1 \lesssim v_2 w_2 : \sigma)$$

$$\llbracket \tau \times \sigma \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) \triangleq \exists w_1, w'_1, w_2, w'_2. (v_1 = (w_1, w'_1)) * (v_2 = (w_2, w'_2)) * \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}(w_1, w_2) * \llbracket \sigma \rrbracket_{\Delta}(w'_1, w'_2)$$

$$\llbracket \tau + \sigma \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) \triangleq \exists w_1, w_2. (v_1 = \text{inl}(w_1) * v_2 = \text{inl}(w_2) * \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}(w_1, w_2)) \vee \\ (v_1 = \text{inr}(w_1) * v_2 = \text{inr}(w_2) * \llbracket \sigma \rrbracket_{\Delta}(w_1, w_2))$$

$$\llbracket \mu \alpha. \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) \triangleq (\mu R. \lambda(v_1, v_2). \exists w_1, w_2. (v_1 = \text{fold } w_1) * (v_2 = \text{fold } w_2) * \triangleright \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta, \alpha \mapsto R}(w_1, w_2)) (v_1, v_2)$$

$$\llbracket \forall \alpha. \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) \triangleq \square (\forall R. (\Delta, \alpha \mapsto R \vDash v_1 - \lesssim v_2 - : \tau))$$

$$\llbracket \exists \alpha. \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) \triangleq \exists R, w_1, w_2. (v_1 = \text{pack } w_2) * (v_2 = \text{pack } w_2) * \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta, \alpha \mapsto R}(w_1, w_2)$$

$$\llbracket \text{ref } \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) \triangleq \exists \ell_1, \ell_2. (v_1 = \ell_1) * (v_2 = \ell_2) * \boxed{\exists w_1, w_2. \ell_1 \mapsto w_1 * \ell_2 \mapsto_s w_2 * \llbracket \tau \rrbracket_{\Delta}(w_1, w_2)}^{\mathcal{N}. \ell_1. \ell_2}$$

$$\llbracket \text{tape} \rrbracket_{\Delta}(v_1, v_2) \triangleq \exists \iota_1, \iota_2, N. (v_1 = \iota_1) * (v_2 = \iota_2) * \boxed{\iota_1 \hookrightarrow (N, \varepsilon) * \iota_2 \hookrightarrow_s (N, \varepsilon)}^{\mathcal{N}. \iota_1. \iota_2}$$